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Traditionally, only one basic question confronted the father of
an illegitimate child - should he marry the mother or should he get
out of town? The days when this simple issue was the sole considera-
tion of the father appear to be behind us. Today, some fathers of
illegitimate children have become "family men" and may wish to be
heard with respect to the child's custody. They may desire to have
a right to visit the child, or they may want to be heard on the question
whether the child should be adopted. All this has caused problems for
the courts, for the state legislatures and for unwed mothers. These
groups probably long - either overtly or covertly - for the simpler
days when the problem was economic pursuit of the unwed father
through the medium of a bastardy suit. Nevertheless, because of the
efforts of one Peter Stanley and his attorney, unwed fathers and their
rights have become a legal matter to be reckoned with. The following
examination of recent cases will illustrate the types of questions
courts have faced when dealing with the rights of unwed fathers.
I. THE Stanley DECISION
It has been observed that "hard cases make bad law," and critics
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois,
may find this observation applicable to that case. Under the facts of
that case (as stated by Mr. Justice White), Peter Stanley, an unwed
father, had lived with one Joan Stanley intermittently for 18 years
during which time the couple had had three children. Although the
state in which they lived, Illinois, did not have common law marriage,
there is an implied suggestion in the decision of the Court that Joan
and Peter Stanley had a "de facto" family. In that regard, it is
interesting to note that Joan and Peter even used the same surname.
According to Justice White, "When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley
lost not only her but also his children." 2 Seldom, in his tenure on the
Court has Justice White seemed so sentimental!3
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3 Or so willing to abandon procedural technicalities. The due process issue had not been
raised by Stanley's attorney in the lower courts.
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Apparently, after Joan's death a dependency proceeding was
instituted by the State of Illinois, and Stanley's children were de-
clared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed guardians.
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his dissent, the whole proce-
dure might not have happened if Peter Stanley had continued to
maintain both custody and support of his children.4 He had, however,
placed them with another couple (named Ness), and had not legally
sought custody. Stanley entered into a legal dispute only when the
state was about to place his children with court-appointed guardians.
Under Illinois law Mr. Stanley, the unwed father, had no stand-
ing to participate in that proceeding. Only married mothers and fa-
thers, or unwed mothers, had that right. The state could assign the
children to another guardian without showing that Stanley was an
unfit parent. In effect, under Illinois law at the time, Stanley was
treated, not as a parent, but as a stranger to his children. The de-
pendency proceeding went forward on the presumption that he was
"unfit" to exercise parental rights.
The Supreme Court declared the Illinois procedure unconstitu-
tional on two grounds. First, the Court decided that Stanley had been
deprived of the equal protection of the law. By denying him a hearing
while allowing it for all other parents, Illinois law unconstitutionally
discriminated among those who had a primary biological tie to the
child. Although the Court assumed that an unmarried father might
seldom be "fit" to be a proper parent, it decided that a blanket policy
of unfitness could not be justified. In that regard, the Court relied on
an older Michigan decision which found no
sociological data justifying the assumption than an illegitimate child
reared by his natural [unmarried] father is less likely to receive a
proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at
one time married to his mother...I
The state simply could not justify its procedure by the unproven
but strongly asserted assumption that most unwed fathers are unfit.
The Court recognized that providing an individualized hearing in
each case on the fitness or lack thereof of an unwed father might be
more costly to the state than the procedure it had been using. Never-
theless, the Court noted that
[T]he incremental cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity for
individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal. If unwed
fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their
405 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 654 n.7. Quoting from In re Mark T., 8 Mich.App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967).
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children, they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do
care. . .[the State of] Illinois would admittedly at some later time
have to afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody or
adoption proceedings.'
As its second and perhaps more important constitutional ground
for decision, the Court held that due process required that Stanley
be provided a hearing on the question of his fitness as a parent. In
that regard, the Court was protecting the interest of a parent in his
or her children. The due process holding strongly suggests that the
Illinois procedure could not be made constitutional by a law that
declared both the unwed mother and unwed father presumptively to
be unfit as parents. 7 In that regard, one should note the Court's
statement that "The private interest here, that of a man in the chil-
dren he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." 8
This statement and the facts of the opinion suggest that it is only
applicable to unwed fathers who have maintained an ongoing rela-
tionship with their illegitimate children-those who either have had
custody of them or have supported them. Nonetheless, in a footnote
to the opinion the Court spoke more broadly about, "[e]xtending
opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim com-
petence to care for their children. . . ."I The Court called for notice
to the unwed fathers in the form of:
personal service, notice by certified mail, or. . . notice by publica-
tion when personal or certified mail service cannot be had or when
notice is directed to unknown respondents under the style of "All
whom it may Concern." 10
Further, the Court noted that unwed fathers who fail to respond
promptly may not complain if their children are declared wards of
the state; "[t]hose who do respond carry the burden of proving their
fatherhood.""
The possibility that the Stanley decision applies to all unwed
fathers, not merely those who have raised their children, gained force
from the fact that two weeks after that decision, the Supreme Court
I Id. at 657 n.9.
7 The court took a similar approach in finding that miscegenation statutes violated both
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
* 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis alded).
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vacated and remanded an appeal wherein the unwed father sought to
be heard in an adoption proceeding although he had not raised or
nurtured his children.' 2 Another case was similarly handled although
the father had had custody for a relatively short period of time.'3
The Stanley decision and those that followed in its wake made
new law in many states by implicitly overruling the many state cases
that had interpreted the common law as saying that the father of an
illegitimate child had no custodial or other legal parental rights with
respect to the child. 4 Clearly, it is no longer constitutionally permis-
sible to foreclose the unwed father to that extent. Moreover, there has
been a general thrust in Supreme Court decisions to treat illegitimacy
vel non as a suspect classification.1 5 Perhaps, there is an underlying
assumption that illegitimacy is not prevented by imposing sanctions
on parents or on the children. On the other hand, in the view of some,
there is or should be a difference between the rights of a father who
marries and has a "legal family" and those of the father who does
not take that step.
What rights should be accorded to an unwed father in a custody
or adoption proceeding? What rights, if any, should he have of child
visitation? These topics will be explored herein, but let us first con-
sider the unwed father's rights with respect to his unborn child.
II. UNWED FATHER'S RIGHT TO His UNBORN CHILD
Just a few years ago, the case of Jones v. Smith" could only have
existed in the imaginative mind of a law professor bent on exploring
legal fantasies. In Jones, a "self-alleged" unwed father sought to
restrain the mother of an unborn child from obtaining an abortion.
Of course, until recently abortion was illegal, and in many states
unwed fathers were thought to have no rights with respect to their
children.
In spite of the mind-boggling social policies at counterpoint in
the case, the Florida court had little difficulty reaching a decision.
The guiding star the court looked to was not Stanley, but the Su-
preme Court decisions of Roe v. Wade 7 and Doe v. Bolton." The
12 Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
13 Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
, See cases collected in Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 216, 224-25 (1972).
" See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968). But see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1972); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 52 (1971).
11 278 So. 2d 330 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
IT 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Is 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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court believed that those two cases made clear that the abortion
decision and its implementation must be left to the judgment of the
mother and her attending physician. Nevertheless, under the statu-
tory law of Florida, a married woman who was living with her hus-
band needed her husband's consent to have an abortion. 9 The court
did not focus on the constitutionality of that statutory provision. The
court decided only that the mother need not obtain consent from
either her husband or any unwed father with whom she did not live
on a regular basis. The court made light of the unwed father's argu-
ment that, by her failure to use birth control methods, the mother
"waived" her right to "exclusively" control whether a child would be
born. It also rejected the contention that the father's agreement to
support the child resulted in his having an implied contractual right
to prevent an abortion.
Finally, the court indicated that a decision to grant an unwed
father "standing" to prevent a natural mother from terminating preg-
nancy would place him in a position of being able to argue success-
fully that he should have the right to obtain an injunction to restrain
a woman he was having relations with from using contraceptives or
possibly that he should have the right to compel her to bear children.
While the court's "parade of horribles" was a bit farfetched, its
underlying decision is based upon a premise that might be gleaned
from Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: a woman has a fundamental
right to determine whether she should bear a child."0
Recently, a Massachusetts court in Doe v. Doe 2 respected that
exclusive right although in that case it was challenged by her lawfully
wedded husband. The lawful husband is in a stronger position to be
heard on the question because he is more likely to be ready, willing,
and able to provide a parental role in the context of a "normal"
family. Of couse, the basic issue is one of balancing the mother's right
to terminate a pregnancy with the father's right to the custody of the
child he helped conceive. In the Massachusetts case, two dissenting
judges thought that the married father, at least, had a right to be
heard on the issue.22 Although reasonable persons might differ-as
did the judges on the Massachusetts court-on the question of the
rights of the wedded father, with regard to unwed fathers, the
mother's right to make the decision is clearly paramount.
11 LAws OF FLA. ch. 72-196, F.S.A. § 458.22 (West Supp. 1973).
2' See Jones v. Smith, supra note 16, at 341.
11 43 U.S.L.W. 2029 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. July 3, 1974).
22 Id.
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III. BASIC PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS - CUSTODY AND ADOPTION
The Stanley case strongly suggests that when judicial action is
taken with respect to the custody of an illegitimate child, an effort
must be made to contact the father of that child unless that father's
rights have been previously adjudicated." When the father is known,
as was the case in Stanley, an effort must be made to obtain personal
service on him. When the father is unknown or there is some specula-
tion about who the father is [the true situation of the "putative
father"], 24 a reasonable effort must be made to locate him, utiliz-
ing notice by publication, if necessary. In that regard, it is clear that
Stanley indicates that fathers of illegitimate children - all fathers
- should be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
issue of placement of their children. This procedural approach has
been molded into a workable law by the legislature of the State of
Washington - that state's new "Illegitimate Children and Parental
Rights Act ' 25 is a worthwhile starting point for any state seeking a
legislative vehicle for implementing the Stanley decision.
One problem not covered by the Washington act - or by law
in any state - is how to handle the situation if the unwed mother
knows or suspects who the father is, but refuses to name him. In this
situation, should the law impose a penalty or sanction against the
mother if she declines to assist the authorities? She may well be doing
this because the situation would prove embarassing to the father as
well as to herself. The father may be married and have another family
or be a person who is totally uninterested in a parental role. Closely
tied to this problem is a second question which needs further atten-
tion: how specific may notice be without embarrassing both mother
and child? The basic question is how far courts or legislatures should
carry Stanley. Of some significance in Stanley was the fact that the
mother was dead and the father had cared for the children over many
years. To compel a living mother to "reveal the name" of an appar-
ently uninterested father extends the decision too far.
Of course the father of an illegitimate child may want his rights
determined with respect to that child even though the state or other
persons have not initiated the custody or adoption proceedings. In
that context, a court may have to struggle to find a procedural vehicle
2' See note 9, supra.
24 R. v. F., 113 N.J. Super. 396, 407, 273 A.2d 808, 814 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1971),
construing statute to allow an unwed father who was not "putative" the right to visit his child.
2 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190 (1973), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190 (1963).
The benefits and shortcomings of the law are conscientiously evaluated in a student note. See
49 WASH. L. REv. 647 (1974).
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to provide relief. In some states, such as Ohio, there is a statute that
permits an unwed father to legitimatize his child.26 This may be an
appropriate tool for providing the father with the relief he wants. Of
course, the Ohio statute, like most others, requires the mother's "con-
sent" as a prerequisite to legitimation. If the father has maintained
an interest in the child and a willingness to support him, it is doubtful,
under the Stanley decision, that the mother could bar absolutely the
child's being declared legitimate in regard to the father. Of course, a
basic social policy question is whether the child should be declared
legitimate as to the mother or the father without a marriage between
these two persons. If legitimation can be handled by the law, without
marriage, then we have almost burd the traditional concept of the
legal family as a practical matter. Of course, many "families" in
Sweden have lived rather comfortably with this approach for a num-
ber of years!
If the state has no legitimation statute, the father may be able
to obtain a declaratory judgment as to his rights with respect to the
child. This was the procedure chosen by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in Slawek v. Stroh,27 a case in which the father of an illegiti-
mate child brought an action against the mother and the child seeking
a declaration that he was the father of the child and also asking that
his rights and duties be determined with respect to custody, visitation
and support of the child. The court noted that the requisites for a
declaratory judgment proceeding were all present. These included a
justiciable controversy that was ripe for determination between two
persons whose interests were adverse (herein the mother and the
father-in other situations a state official could be appointed to
"test" the father's claim). Further, a legally protectable interest ex-
isted in the plaintiff (this was wrought by the Stanley case).
The Washington Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act
has simplified the procedure by establishing a Filiation Proceeding in
which the child's "name" and custody can be established as well as
the non-custodial parent's visitation rights.2
In sum, the procedural difficulties created by Stanley may be less
troublesome than the substantive changes left somewhat undefined by
the decision. The following discussion of the substantive changes sug-
gested by the Stanley decision begins with a look at the unwed fa-
ther's right to custody of the child.
21 OHIo REV. CODE § 2105.18 (1972).
62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
23 WASH. REV. CoDE § 26.24.190 (1973), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190 (1963).
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IV. CUSTODY
As I have indicated, the Stanley decision makes clear that an
unwed father has a right to be heard with respect to a legal determina-
tion of the custody of his child. However, the Stanley decision did not
suggest what indicia for a custody decision should be. Perhaps the
most central question in formulating these indicia is what effect the
father's unwed status should have. To aid in answering that question,
the situation in which the mother is a contestant should be distin-
guished from that in which she is not.
A. Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother
Before Stanley, a number of courts had granted an unwed father
a special status with respect to the custody of his child. His right was
superior to that of all persons except the mother of the child.29 In re
Mark T., relied on by the Supreme Court in Stanley for the proposi-
tion that all unwed fathers may not be unfit parents," emphasized
that the father's rights with respect to custody were secondary to the
mother's.3 1
Subsequent to the Stanley decision, an Ohio court indicated that
a mother was always to be deemed to have a superior right to the
father unless it was shown that she was an unfit parent. In the case
of In re Brenda H.,32- the court awarded a child to its mother after
determing that she would be a fit parent. Although the child had been
in the custody of the father, the court did not permit him to present
evidence of his own comparative fitness. The court appeared to say
that if the mother and father of the child have lived together and
established a "parental" relationship, the mother and the father
would be treated as equals. In the situation before the court, however,
the court was clear that "[t]he mother has a right of custody that is
superior to that of the putative father."33
Decisions in other states have not created a special preference
for the mother. In Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan34 two children had been
conceived and born after the couple was divorced. The children were
orginally in the custody of the mother; however, she wrote the father
" See Annot. 45 A.L.R.3d 216, 223-24 (1972).
" 405 U.S. at 654 n.7.
31 In re Mark T., 8 Mich.App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967).
32 37 Ohio Misc. 123, 305 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio C.P. Juv. Div., Cuyahoga County 1973).
3 305 N.E.2d at 817 (emphasis in original). Cf Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517
P.2d 1019 (1974). (Formerly wed parents, father's challenge to presumption in favor of mother
on equal protection grounds was denied.)
u 9 II.App. 2d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1973).
[Vol. 36
RIGHTS OF A FATHER
that the children would be better off with him. A year later, the
mother petitioned for custody. She showed a change in circumstances
in that she was about to be married and would be able to provide a
good home for the children. The trial court made a determination
that it was in the best interest of the children to remain with the
father. The court of appeals reversed," but this decision was vacated
and remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States in light of
Stanley." Upon remand the Illinois court of appeals followed the
original findings of the trial court and continued custody in the fa-
ther 7.3 No special "presumption" of legal preference was given to
either party. Similarly, in setting the guidelines for a custody dispute
between unwed parents, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin in the
Slawek case38 created no special presumption or preference for either
parent. This also appears to be the approach of the new Washington
Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act .3
I would agree with the approaches taken in these states.
Assuming that the act of having children out of wedlock is a social
wrong and one to be considered in a custody proceeding, the parties
are in pari delicto on that issue." The assumption that the father is
somehow more blameworthy than the mother belongs to a prior age.
The case should be treated as one between wedded parents, and the
focus should be on the best interest of the child. Nevertheless, it is
helpful to have a presumption operate in custody cases in order to
facilitate decision-making. In this regard, if one of the parents has
maintained custody of the child since birth, it seems both wise and
fair to presume that he or she should maintain custody." The other
party would then have to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she would be a more able custodial parent. What then are
the evidentiary factors to be considered?
A number of factors have been articulated by courts12 in deter-
" 126 IIl.App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1971).
- 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
31 See note 34, supra.
u 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
3 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110 (1973).
0 Cf Exparte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940) (visitation).
," At least two reasons suggest this result. First, as a general matter of allocating burdens
of proof, the law usually places the onus on the party who seeks to change the status quo. See
E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 75 (1956); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d Ed.
1940). Second, in the absence of other facts, changing the abode of a young child is not in his
or her best interest. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 31-34 (1973).
42 See, e.g., In re Zink, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964); In re Guardianship of
C., 98 N.J. Super. 474, 237 A.2d 652 (1967); In re Interest of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d
1013 (1970).
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mining which parent should have custody of an illegitimate child.
While a "total picture" must be developed, the following factors may
be of assistance to a court in making a decision.
(1) Has the father readily acknowledged paternity under oath?
(2) Has he willingly contributed to the support of the child?
(3) Has he accepted or asked for the responsibility of maintaining
the child?
(4) Is he likely to be able to provide financial support for the child
in the future?
(5) Has he provided an adequate means for the child to be cared
for during the day?
All of these factors - with the exception of the acknowledgment
of paternity - are equally applicable to the mother.
Some of the older cases also considered whether the father was
willing to "marry the girl. 43 Perhaps some inquiry into his reasons
(or possibly the mother's) on this issue would be helpful, but the focus
should never stray from the ultimate issue before the court: which
parent would be better able to care for this particular child.
B. Father v. Relative or Stranger
Even before the Stanley decision, some courts gave the unwed
father a right to custody superior to that of any person other than
the mother of the child." Is this a necessary or desirable approach in
determining custody when a relative of the child or adoption agency
is opposing the father's application?
It is a long step from Stanley to the creation of a special pre-
sumption in favor of an unwed father when his application for cus-
tody is being opposed by a relative or adoption agency. Even lan-
guage in Stanley refers to a child whom the father had raised. My
own view is that a presumption should only arise in favor of an unwed
father when he has supported and raised the child for a period of time.
The burden then should be placed on the other party to show that the
father is an unfit parent. In all other cases, the focus should be solely
on the child's best interest. When the father has done no more than
participate in the act of conception, he has not established a sufficient
See Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188, 192 (1945).
" See, e.g., Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Shady,
264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962); Hyman v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 63 A.2d 447
(1949); In re Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d 792, 415 P.2d 653 (1966).
The oldest case found applying the rule is Trainer v. Cooper, 8 How. Pr. 288 (N.Y. 1853)
where a Black father's claim to his young daughter was deemed superior to the claim of a
person who had once "owned" the child.
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basis to be granted a "superior right" to other persons who may
provide a better home for the child.4"
Of course, it could be argued that because the unwed father has
the same potential duty to support the child as a wedded father," he
should be given a special status as against all but the mother. But the
duty is merely potential - when there has been no real obligation
placed on the father, it has little meaning.
However, treating the unwed father the same as a "non-relative"
is a position that can be subject to the same criticisms47 that were
voiced against Painter v. Bannister"8 in which a "best interests" test
was applied to deprive a widower of his child anl award the child to
his grandparents. In that case, however, the child had lived with the
father all his life. The combination of being a riatural parent plus
having custody is enough to create a presumption in favor of the
father. In other cases, the "natural" connection is more a pleasure
of the past than an indicia of responsibility for the future.
Naturally, the factors outlined in considering a custody dispute
between parents are relevant here.4" In addition there is the question
whether the father's very participation in the conception of the
child should be utilized against him in determining his fitness. Cer-
tainly, pre-Stanley cases took this factor into consideration. 0 But if
we focus on the best-interest of the child, the father's act should not
be material unless it was part of a pattern of generally irresponsible
behavior.
V. VISITATION RIGHTS
The Stanley decision did not speak to the question whether an
unwed father should have the right to visit his illegitimate child
when that child is in the custody of another person. This difficult
question often arises in disputes between the father and mother of the
illegitimate child, but there has been very little serious discussion of
the issue elsewhere. 51 Although some prior judicial decisions indicated
"See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
16-17 (1973).
" See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (having that effect). But cf. Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
11 See Stingley v. Wesch, 77 III.App. 2d 472, 222 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1966). See also Notes,
8 ARMz L. REv. 163 (1966); 79 HARV. L. REV. 1710 (1966); 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 131 (1966);
51 IOwA L. REV. 1114 (1966); 20 OKLA. L. REV. 203 (1967); 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 181 (1967);
41 TUL. L. REV. 148 (1966); 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1966).
4S 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
, See note 41, supra, and accompanying text.
', See In re Zink, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964).
5, See 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1966); 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 307 (1969); Annot. 15 A.L.R.3d
887 (1967).
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that the father could never have visitation rights, most courts today
do not take such a firm position on the matter." Rather, they indicate
that they will focus on the "welfare and best interest of the child" in
determining whether or not the father should be permitted to visit.5 3
Of course, the case for allowing a visit is most persuasive when
the mother consents. The more difficult situation occurs when the
mothers does not wish the father to visit the child. Factors that
prompt courts 54 to allow visitation rights in that situation include:
(1) The amount of the father's contribution to the maintenance of
the child,
(2) Whether the father and mother lived together in a relationship
that approximated a legal marriage,
(3) The father's prior interest in the child's welfare and well-being,
and
(4) The child's need for guidance by a mature male.
On the other hand, there are very strong general considerations
that suggest that courts should be chary of permitting visitation by
an unwed father where custody has been vested in the mother. First,
the father's visits may create a situation which encourages a renewal
of a meretricious relationship. While such a relationship might be
quite acceptable to some segments of society, it is still not the equiva-
lent of marriage under the law of any state. 5 Second, and more
importantly, visits emphasize and remind neighbors and acquaint-
ances that the child was born illegitimate. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the father's visits can be a factor that reduces the mother's
likelihood of adjustment and formulation of a legal marriage and
normal family relationship. As family lawyers know well, visitation
can create extraordinary problems between once-married parents of
legitimate children. Clearly, the potential conflicts are even greater
when the parents were never married at all.5"
These considerations may prompt the Supreme Court of the
United States to hold that visitation is not a "constitutional right"
52 See Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965) (overruling
prior decisions on the point).
" See, e.g., Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal.App. 2d 336, 305 P.2d 48 (1949); Commonwealth
v. Rozanski, note 52 supra; In re Harp, 6 Wash.App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059 (1972).
" See cases cited note 53 supra, note 58 infra, and Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.
2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Family Ct. 1968).
" The closest courts that have come to giving recognition can be found in the recent case
of In re Cary, 34 Cal.App. 3d 345, 109 Cal.Rptr. 862 (1973); noted in 25 HASTINGS L. REV.
1226 (1973).
" The arguments against quasi-automatic allowance of visitation by unwed fathers have
been made most forcefully by Justice Breitel dissenting in People ex rel "Francois" v. "Iva-
nova," 14 A.D.2d 317, 318, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1961).
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as long as the father has had an opportunity to be heard on the.issue
of custody. However, in some situations contact by the child with his
natural father may be helpful for the child's psychological well-being
even though the mother opposes such a visit.57 Moreover, the factors
mentioned earlier favoring visitation can create a very compelling
case to permit it. For example, consider a situation in which a father
had lived with the mother in a relationship approximating marriage
for a number of years, and had supported and developed a solid,
ongoing relationship with the child.58 In the absence of other facts,
the father's request for visitation should be allowed.
But even in this situation a very careful, impartial, factual inves-
tigation is essential. In that regard, at least one New York court has
taken the position that visitation should only be allowed after the
state Family Counselling Unit has made an extensive investigation of
the specific situation. This is to be done regardless of the parents'
consent.5 Obviously, the effectiveness of such an investigation de-
pends on the capability of the personnel in the Family Counselling
Unit. Because there is a strong social need to have courts render
decisions that are truly in the best interests of children, the state
should bear the cost of having qualified personnel who can assist the
courts in making this very difficult determination.
VI. ADOPTION
Adoption terminates the existing relationship between parent
and child and substitutes a new legal relationship with a different set
of parents. 0 Therefore,once the child is adopted by another father, it
is highly likely that the unwed father's rights with respect to visitation
and other connections with the child will be terminated.
What are or should be the unwed father's rights when someone
else seeks to adopt his child? The unwed mother's rights are relatively
clear: unless she has legally abandoned her child or has been found
to be an unfit parent, her consent is required before the child can be
legally adopted."1 The unwed father's consent, however, was not a
prerequisite to adoption in many states, at least not prior to Stanley. 2
"See M. GOLD, STATUS FORCES IN DELINQUENT Boys 123 (1963); E. JONES, THE INTEL-
LIGENT PARENTS' GUIDE TO RAISING CHILDREN 217-19 (1959).
6 Cases close to this "ideal" include Mixon v. Mize, 198 So.2d 373 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1967); M. v. M., 112 N.J. Super, 540, 271 A.2d 919'(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1970).
" See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 34 A.D.2d 942, 312 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970).
"See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 18.1 (1968).
6l Id. at §§ 18.4, 18.5.
" See, e.g., CODE OF ALA., TIT. 27, § 3 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.020 (1962); OHIO
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The view was that the process of acquiring such consent would sub-
stantially hamper the work of welfare agencies concerned with adop-
tion.63 Moreover, it could place all adoptions in a legally unstable
position for extended periods of time.
Although the Supreme Court in Stanley did not focus on adop-
tion, it vacated and remanded a decision two weeks later wherein the
state court had precluded an unwed father from being heard on the
issue whether his child should be adopted by others.Y4 The Supreme
Court said that:
[D]ue consideration [should be given] for the completion of adop-
tion proceedings and the fact that the child has apparently lived with
the adoptive family for the intervening period of time. 5
It is important to note what the Supreme Court did not say as
well as what it said. The Court did not state that an unwed father's
consent was necessary in order to effectuate a legal adoption. Rather,
the remand implied that unwed fathers should be given an opportun-
ity to be heard on the general question. This is the way the decision
has been interpreted by some courts in cases that have arisen after
Stanley.6
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after tak-
ing the remand in Rothstein, may have given the father in that spe-
cific case more than the United States Supreme Court intended 7 In
that regard, the court might have been able to support a holding that
in light of the period of time that had elapsed since the child had been
with his "adopted parents" - here four years - the unwed father's
claim must be abated. The court declined to take this approach, but
rather remanded the case to the county court to determine the relative
fitness of the unwed father as a custodial parent. Further, the opinion
contained a bit of hornbook law that has been applied in the past to
unwed mothers: "[A]s between a natural parent and a third party, the
'best interest of the child' lie with the natural parents' exercise of
custodial rights."6 Three judges on the Wisconsin supreme court
REv. CODE § 3107.06 (1972); Wis. STAT. § 48.84 (1957). Even in Arizona where every child is
deemed legitimate, the consent of the mother is sufficient for adoption. See ARtz. REv. STAT.
§ 8-106(d) (1972) (prior acknowledgement gives father standing). See generally, Annot. 51
A.L.R.2d 497 (1957).
See Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).
' Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
" Id.
68 See Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 IIl. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); In re
P., 36 Mich.App. 497, 194 N.W.2d 18 (1972); Doe v. Dep't of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666,
337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
' See Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
Is d. at 832.
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dissented, stating that the interests of the child clearly pointed to his
remaining with his adopted parents."
When the Stanley decision is applied to adoption cases, it may
cause more problems with procedure than substance.7 Adoption
agencies and adopting parents want to know when the adoption will
be final. Unless the state has set up a proper procedure for notice to
potential unwed fathers (as has been done in the State of Washing-
ton)," adoptions of many illegitimate children will be placed in jeop-
ardy. I would be inclined to let pre-Stanley adoptions be deemed
legally consummated, unless a situation arises in which the adoptive
parents have neglected the children. Aside from the Rothstein case
itself, wherein a father fought for his rights all the way to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the child's and adoptive parents'
interest in a stable home situation outweigh reopening a matter long
settled .72
With respect to future adoptions the unwed father should be
treated the same as the unwed mother. Nevertheless, courts should
be quite realistic in deciding whether either unwed parent is sutiable
and fit to care for the child on a long-range basis.
VII. CONCLUSION
This discussion has been but an introductory exploration of the
rights of the unwed father today. There are many questions of im-
portance that have not been adverted to, especially in the area of the
unwed father's economic rights with respect to his illegitimate
child. 73 But from the discussion of the questions that have been
explored it is apparent that the rights of the unwed father in regard
to his children are drawing very close to those of the unwed mother.
No doubt, in some situations in some states, a reservoir of superior
power in the unwed mother remains. A period of time and study is
needed to determine the effect upon children of living with unwed
fathers as compared to living with unwed mothers. This information
" Id. at 833.
7 See The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1974, at 1, col. 1, tracing the practical problems
that the Stanley decision has created in regard to adoption.
" WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040 (1973), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040 (1963).
12 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
31-37 (1973).
" For example the question whether an unwed father can be automatically excluded
from intestate succession has not been explored. (This would not seem to be constitutionally
required in light of Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).) There is also the question
whether an unwed father will be deemed a beneficiary under a Federal Employee's Group Life
Insurance Plan. See Solberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 2d 746, 185 N.W.2d 319
(1971).
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may tell us whether the states that have broadened the Stanley deci-
sion or those that have approached it gingerly have truly had "the
best interest" of the child in sight.
